oplan 8010 pdf
Instead of one "spasm" attack, it proposed five escalating attack options:[19], Many smaller target options were also created for possible use. The first was part of a UK-only retaliatory response to a nuclear attack, whether a full strategic strike, or a limited tactical strike. While the details have never been made public, Eisenhower's predelegation, and a Federation of American Scientists summary, give a framework. The President, as a member of the National Command Authority, (NCA) may order the use of nuclear weapons. Media Copy of OPLAN 8010 cover sheet 21 Feb 13 21 Feb 13 15 MMar 13 16 Fees Not Applicable $191.50 Hans Kristensen DISPOSITION: CLOSED - TOTAL RELEASE 13-013 SECRET,/ NOFORN All Others All documents from Aug 1, 2001 to the ppections, including but not limited to the exchange of funds, training, arms, weapons, logistics, advice, This document established a more detailed and elaborate set of goals and conditions that included targeting and damage criteria for the use of nuclear weapons. ��&��S��µ�� v�ԑ�f�N}S�ё�Qb"-n���B]���9�a둿�F�Ѧ�6�6�b�=0�Ͷ譨��6J�?SZ�k6r,��? In January 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower inherited the Truman administration's large defense budget. [59], While current United Kingdom's nuclear forces—four Trident Vanguard-class submarines—are strictly under UK national control, they had two distinct roles under the SIOP. He aimed to change the doctrine from massive retaliation to flexible response. [9] In 1999, the NTB reportedly included targets in Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.[10]. Examples: Factories for ammunition and tanks, refineries, steel and aluminum plants, power plants. Only absolutely necessary data should be collected. The degree of cooperation was such by the Cuban Missile Crisis that RAF officers visiting SAC headquarters in Nebraska reported being "treated just like Americans. For psy-ops, see, Early targeting after the Second World War, Presidential involvement and start of civilian policy direction, Counterforce migrates to deterrence and warfighting, Return to counterforce, with strategic defense, In U.S. classified documents, paragraphs and titles may have classification markings such as (S) for SECRET, (U) for UNCLASSIFIED, (C) for CONFIDENTIAL, and (TS) for TOP SECRET. Then, using Milstar, a Yankee White would contact the National Military Command Center and NORAD to determine the scope of the pre-emptive nuclear strike and prepare a second strike, following which Milstar/Advanced Extremely up to TOP SECRET OPLAN 8010 (reference h) and nuclear Planning and Execution System (NPES) traffic to and from the Survivable Mobile Command Center community, and those fixed command center sites that employ NPES. 662 0 obj <> endobj d.c. 20350'2000 and headquarters united states marine corps 3000 m ne corps pentagon washington, dc 20350-3000 opnavinst 8010.12g mco 8010.12a n4/cmc (asl) 23 oct 07 "[36][37], SIOP-62 included the virtual obliteration of the tiny country of Albania because within its borders sat huge Soviet air-defense radar, which had to be taken out with high assurance. configuration, and capabilities that handle OPLAN 8010 (reference d) information. The circuitry controlling the PAL is deliberately positioned inside the warhead such that it cannot be reached without disabling the weapon, at a minimum, to a level that would require a full factory-level rebuild. Home; Politica; Mondo. If the NCA decides that the United States must launch nuclear weapons, the decision is communicated to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and through him to the National Military Command Center (often called the "war room") via the Presidential Emergency Satchel, informally referred to as the "football." We went all through their briefings, computers, top secret rooms and so forth". ��t棌�[{'2I2�b� �)gΪ͍�[�#�C"�+�����xa����o������;����QfW0�� �~3���*V0 �f�� Individual countries or regions can be included in or withheld from nuclear attacks depending on circumstances. The agreement permitted Britain to commit only nominal forces to SACEUR, and presaged future technology and targeting cooperation. [13][14]:93–95 In August 1950 Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews publicly advocated a preventive war, but NSC 68 forecast that even after a massive preventive attack the USSR would likely not surrender and its forces could still "dominate most or all of Eurasia. The SIOP was a highly classified document, and was one of the most secret and sensitive issues in U.S. national security policy. The author was also skeptical of whether communications to manage escalation—whether on the Moscow–Washington hotline, or between command authorities and their deployed nuclear submarines and bombers—could be maintained, and observed that use of nuclear weapons "are not suited to signalling any precise and unambiguous message".[19]. [12] By 1948, the year of the Berlin Blockade, British leaders expected that "in a future world conflict, US and British forces will find themselves fighting side by side" although the alliance had not been formally renewed. [22] From a 1957 letter from John H. Moore, former director of nuclear planning, air operations branch, United States European Command, Air Force target planning methodology can be inferred "blast damage frame," with such references as "damage to concrete structures" and the requirement for a "high probability of cratering runways." Based on the Korean precedent, the Soviets apparently expected that the West would not use atomic weapons in a European war. The Warsaw Pact plan did not consider the possibility that American strategic weapons might have crippled the Soviet Union, assuming that superior Soviet air defenses would have stopped most enemy missiles while invading NATO troops would have, the plan stated, "suffered enormous losses from [Soviet] nuclear strikes". During the Reagan administration, there was a return to a strong counterforce strategy through NSDD-13. Since July 2012, the US nuclear war plan has been OPLAN [15] Plan BROILER (November 1947) envisioned 34 bombs on 24 Soviet cities. "[14]:71–74,400–402, The United States preferred that Britain not develop atomic weapons at all. Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise USSTRATCOM Operational Plan (OPLAN) 8010-08, Global Deterrence and Strike, 1 Obama and the Nuclear War Plan. Given the apparent impracticality of massive retaliation strategy, Army Chiefs of Staff Matthew Ridgway and his successor Maxwell Taylor argued within JCS that deterrence, instead of the "worst case" scenario of a full-scale nuclear war, should be the focus. In January 1950, he approved Kim Il Sung's proposal to conquer South Korea in what became the Korean War that summer, believing that victory there would discredit NATO. b. The following OPLAN 8010 and OPLAN 8010-related documents, While the president and other civilian and military leaders doubted the morality or legality of preventive war, preemptive war was much less problematic given that NSC 5410/1 March 1954 acknowledged that "the survival of the United States" was at risk. American General Carl Spaatz and Chief of the Air Staff Lord Tedder informally agreed in 1946 to US aircraft using British bases. To increase NATO participation in US nuclear force planning in support ofthealliance,representationwasestab-lished at US Strategic Command [52] "The president has supreme authority to decide whether to use America's nuclear weapons. The final stage in the planning process occurred when the Strategic Air Command (SAC) (from 1961 to 1992) or the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) (from 1992 to 2003) took the guidance from the JSCP and created the actual nuclear war plan that becomes the SIOP. The SIOP was updated annually until February 2003, when it was replaced by Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8044. In the U.S. military, an Operation Plan (OPLAN) is a complete and detailed plan for conducting joint military operations. Joseph comes to us from Globalsecurity.org, and more recently Warisboring.com where he was an associate editor. Some targets and target classes should not be struck, at least at first, to give the opponent a rational reason to terminate the conflict. Soviet nuclear forces. The Royal Navy's contribution to the SIOP was small. Its Basic War Plan of March 1954 planned for up to 735 bombers to simultaneously and massively attack all targets, military and urban, in the USSR. Kistiakowsky's report, presented on 29 November, described uncoordinated plans with huge numbers of targets, many of which would be attacked by multiple forces, resulting in overkill. Polaris was especially notable; British officials initially refused to believe the Americans' offer of state-of-the-art submarine missiles at a moderate price, and one scholar later called it "amazing". Global Strike plans are codified in CONPLAN 8044.[46]. The others are believed to be Iran, North Korea, and Syria with the sixth unknown. SIOP, and its renamed successors, is most importantly an "integrated" plan that uses both Air Force and Navy delivery systems; it is "single" only in the sense that it comes out of one planning group. Although both nations remained reluctant to fully share their plans—as late as 1956, Britain did not have targeting information even for SAC aircraft it hosted—redundancies were eliminated by one side asking the other whether it planned to attack various targets. While the United States was the only nation with the atomic bomb, in 1946 it had only 17 Silverplate B-29 bombers and 11 atomic bombs. The arsenal is com-posed of roughly 1,950 strategic warheads deployed on 798 strategic delivery vehicles, as well as nearly 200 [citation needed], Another set of "Global Strike" plans include a jointly coordinated a nuclear option, intended for other than the general nuclear war situations, principally with Russia but possibly also with China, postulated in OPLAN 8022. As you read this please pray that Lucifer's Plans fail in starting this war. 5. :^7������uh_�������l�out�oe|�ouL>. of global strike: air bridge, OPLAN 8010, and national reserve. He recommended that targets be chosen based on analysis of the results of their destruction, and that "city-avoidance" strategies be studied. As you read this please pray that Lucifer's Plans fail in starting this war. 10121 and Map of San Simon (not draw to scale) Hazard Map I. Weapon scientist, George Rathjens, looked through SAC's atlas of Soviet cities, searching for the town that most closely resembled Hiroshima in size and industrial concentration. configuration, and capabilities that handle OPLAN 8010 (reference d) information. United States []. 2) It led to a substantial rise in nuclear-weapons production. (U) Releasable Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010 documents. Although these three missions [47] Subsequent to the President's decision, the release of nuclear weapons is governed by the two-man rule at all times. Brodie later recalled that "There was no calculated strategy for destroying Soviet capability to make war. The separate service plans were not mutually supporting, as, for example, by the Navy destroying an air defense facility on the route of an Air Force bomber going to a target deeper inland. It is reported that the current Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8010–08 targets at least six countries including Russia and China, the two declared nuclear states. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [34], The first SIOP, based on the massive retaliation doctrine, had little flexibility, treating all Communist countries as a uniform bloc. 10121 and Map of San Simon (not draw to scale) Hazard Map I. .12 ... OPLAN Operations Plan PPD Presidential Policy Directive SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan ... CIA Catalogue of Clandestine Weapons Tools and Gadgets by John Minnery.pdf. When Kistiakowsky was not given access, Eisenhower sent him back with a much stronger set of orders giving SAC officers the choice to cooperate with Kistiakowsky, or resign. . The following principles and goals should guide your efforts in making these improvements. Specifically, he considered delayed radiation but not thermal effects, but called attention to the idea of "bonus" effects,[23] in which the totality of weapons effects would allow lower-yield weapons to achieve the "desired destruction." Although Soviet doctrine incorporated an assumption of innate hostility of the capitalist powers to Communism, Soviet leader Josef Stalin apparently believed that neither the USSR nor the West could afford to fight another world war, and was skeptical of the Western ability to raise an army large enough to occupy Soviet territory. The first plan, following the White House policy guidance, was developed in 1960, consisting of a list of targets (the National Strategic Target List, or NSTL) and the assets to be used against each target. The B-2 was also seen as a counter to Soviet deployment of mobile missiles, which only a manned bomber could find and attack. OPLAN 8010-12 discussed the Trigger Points to launch a Nuclear War, using Nukes, Compressed Titanium Rods, etc. This apparently includes China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and a 9/11-type scenario. For every CONPLAN there mus the an OPLAN. Some of these systems eventually took the role of bargaining chips in arms control negotiations, although some, such as the B-2 "stealth" bomber remained highly classified as potential surprises in war. We use the mission title air bridge to capture the missions of global strike: air bridge, OPLAN 8010, and national reserve. A 1982 analysis stated, however, that the technically inferior Soviet attack-assessment system would likely have difficulty in differentiating between such attacks. [50] If the NMCC is destroyed by a first strike, either the ANMCC, NAOC or Looking Glass can issue the orders to execute the SIOP. "[40], By the mid-1960s both sides had much more accurate understanding of the opposition's forces. Up to that point, the Army, Navy, and Air Force had done their own target planning. (U) Electronic media that contain the information delineated in In any case, given that the majority of Soviet nuclear airfields and missile sites were located west of the Ural mountains, many in major population centers, the analysis concluded that the American plans for flexible use of force were meaningless. Britain would have used the weapons in its own aircraft for its own targets,[55] but refused the offer, and the United States decided that partnership was preferable to losing influence with the United Kingdom. [41] By 1982, SIOP-5 contained more than 40,000 possible targets in four categories:[19], Whether Soviet military doctrine recognized the difference between counterforce and a general attack was unknown. and Global Strike (or OPLAN 8010) (Kristensen and Norris, 2011). plans developed under OPLAN 8010 (formerly the Single Integrated Operational Plan). For every CONPLAN there mus the an OPLAN. JTF CS 101 Brief NORTHCOM Contingency Plans Unclassified / For Official Use Only-CS 101 Brief • N-NC Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) • CONPLAN 3400 HD (Classified Plan) • Approved / Completed Plan • Plan not approved yet CO 3 00 (C ass ed a ) • CONPLAN 3501 DSCA • CONPLAN 3500 CBRNE CM Operations • CONPLAN 3591 Pandemic Influenza (Regional)CONPLAN 3591 Pandemic Influenza (Regional) Most weapons have additional arming circuitry that, even if a valid launch code is entered, will not arm the warhead unless the weapon senses that it has been released on an expected delivery path. Other planners and USAF leadership, however, believed that the Soviet Union could support its "immense armed forces for at least two years of intensive warfare" if industrial and government centers were not attacked. Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, emphasized selective counterforce, but also explicitly threatened the Soviet leadership themselves. [39], During 1961–1962, the Kennedy administration revised this plan as supervised by McNamara. The related Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) of April 1974 provided targets to achieve various goals; for example, the document stated that the United States nuclear forces must possess the ability to destroy 70% of the industrial capacity the Soviet Union needed to recover after a war. Eisenhower sent Kistiakowsky to Strategic Air Command headquarters where he was, at first, rebuffed. 0 (U) Releasable Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010 documents. [14]:120–121 As Tedder complained during the Berlin crisis, when war at any moment seemed possible, the defense of the West relied "on the use of a weapon about which we in fact know very little". Only absolutely necessary data should be collected. The changes could take several years to implement. Some weapons have "dial-a-yield" functions that allow the power of the nuclear explosion to be adjusted from minimum to maximum yield. 8 Bombers [35] Shoup was especially concerned with language in the draft SIOP that said. Journalist Ron Rosenbaum has pointed out that the SIOP is entirely concerned with the identity of the commanding officer and the authenticity of the order, and there are no safeguards to verify that the person issuing the order is actually sane. [12][13] President Harry S. Truman hoped for an international ban on atomic weapons and believed that the American people would not support their use for "aggressive purposes", and ordered JCS to devise a plan for conventional war; however, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in July 1948 ordered it to stop and resume atomic war planning due to the Berlin crisis.
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